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Abstract
Two vulnerable groups in our society are children with psychiatric problems and people with intellectual 
disabilities. The demand for care is growing every year in both groups. The current (Dutch) legal status of 
people with intellectual disabilities and children with psychiatric problems is one in which too much 
attention is devoted to the right to self-determination. An important question is whether this central 
feature is enough to support clients in both groups in such a way that they can develop their abilities. The 
Dutch government is currently preparing new legislation to replace the Psychiatric Hospitals Act. We 
recommend that this legislation should also take account of the right to development and the right to 
good care in order to deal with the dilemmas that will arise in the near future.
Keywords
children with psychiatric problems; people with intellectual disabilities; right to self-determination; right 
to good care; right to development; Dutch Psychiatric Hospitals Act; current and future legal status
1. Introduction
This article makes a link between care for the elderly on the one hand, and care 
for people with intellectual disabilities and children with psychiatric problems on 
the other. People with intellectual disabilities are now living longer, and more 
young people are suﬀering psychiatric problems. Both these groups will ultimately 
become older, and so the conclusions drawn in this article will also be of relevance 
to elderly people in general.
Patients’ rights have attracted particular interest in the Netherlands since the 
1990s, with a great deal of legislation coming into force since then. A central 
feature of the various Acts is that they all focus on the right to self-determination. 
This right, which is seen as one of the basic principles in health law, presupposes 
freedom, whereby individuals have the right to decide how to shape their own 
lives.1 Legislation to date has been based on a very narrow interpretation of 
1) J. Legemaate, “Het zelfbeschikkingsrecht: een oud debat in nieuw licht”, Tijdschrift voor Gezond-
heidsrecht 28 (2004), pp. 18-20.
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self-determination. In the 1990s legislation seemed to operate on the basis of a 
defence or, in other words, the right to structure your life in the way of your 
choosing and without interference by others.2, 3
The right to self-determination is not limited to people with speciﬁc qualities. 
In Leenen’s opinion,4 the right to self-determination is also available to people 
unable to enjoy it. The central idea is that everything possible should be done to 
enable each individual to realize this right, taking into account all opportunities 
and limitations. This basic principle also, therefore, applies to people with intel-
lectual disabilities and to young people with psychiatric problems. This is explic-
itly stated in the preamble of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.5
In recent years various dissenting voices about the actual meaning of self-
 determination in health law have been heard, with some health law specialists 
believing that this emphasis on self-determination threatens the equilibrium 
in health law.6, 7, 8 These discussions are a particularly sensitive issue for those 
groups on which this article focuses. Will these people get the right care if the pri-
mary focus is on self-determination? Adopting a too individualistic view to self-
 determination can potentially represent a threat to vulnerable individuals, such as 
those with intellectual disabilities and young people with psychiatric problems, as 
placing too much emphasis on self-determination can result in these individuals 
not receiving the appropriate care.9
The current legal framework for restrictive measures is very likely to be replaced 
by new legislation in the near future. The way in which this legislation deals with 
self-determination is very important. Will it continue adhering to a narrow inter-
pretation of self-determination? Or will scope be created for a wider interpreta-
tion that also allows account to be taken of two very relevant principles for people 
with intellectual disabilities and children with psychiatric problems; in other 
words, the right to receive good care and the right to development. Many of these 
people have a long life ahead of them, and can each, in their individual way, 
2) H.J.J. Leenen, J.K.M. Gevers and J. Legemaate, Handboek gezondheidsrecht. Deel I: Rechten van mensen 
in de gezondheidszorg, (The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2011) 38.
3) A. Hendriks, B.J.M. Frederiks and M. Verkerk, “Autonomie: dankzij of ondanks goede zorg?”, Tijd-
schrift voor Gezondheidsrecht 32 (2008) 2.
4) Supra note 2.
5) United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Preamble (under n): Recognizing 
the importance for persons with disabilities of their individual autonomy and independence, including 
the freedom to make their own choices.
6) A.C. Hendriks, In beginsel. De gezondheidsrechtelijke beginselen uitgediept, (Leiden: Stichting NJCM-
Boekerij, 2006), p. 11.
7) V.E.T. Dörenberg, Kind en stoornis. Een systematisch onderzoek naar de rechtspositie van minderjarigen in 
de kinder- en jeugdpsychiatrie (diss.), (The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2010), pp. 372-373.
8) B.J.M. Frederiks, “The rights of people with an intellectual disability in the Netherlands: From 
restriction to development”, European Journal of Health Law 14 (2007) 149-163.
9) Supra note 3, p. 3.
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develop as a person. But that demands appropriate care. Another relevant ques-
tion concerns the consequences that the focus on self-determination has for the 
future of the two groups, assuming that both ultimately become elderly. Can they 
grow old with conﬁdence?
Based on the above issues and the various questions posed, the central question 
in this article is whether the right to self-determination is still the best principle 
in health law, particularly in respect of the care provided to people with intellec-
tual disabilities and children with psychiatric problems. Against the background 
of changes in client populations, but also in beliefs about care and support, we 
discuss whether more attention needs to focus on other principles in health law 
and what the consequences of this will be for the right to self-determination. At 
the end of this article we discuss the consequences that our ﬁndings have for the 
target group of elderly people.
2. Two Groups of Vulnerable People
Traditionally, it is a government’s duty to protect, respect and fulﬁl the rights of 
its citizens and those under its jurisdiction. These include certain groups of people 
who are particularly vulnerable in view of their speciﬁc problems, risks and needs. 
One of these special groups is children. In view of their dependence on adults, 
children are at particular risk and require special attention to overcome their vul-
nerability to physical and psychological trauma and to deal with the developmen-
tal needs to be met if they are to be assured of normal growth and development. 
This is why children can be taken into care if their parents put them at risk or are 
unable to fulﬁl the children’s needs.
Psychiatric problems make children even more vulnerable and thus add to 
their problems, risks and needs. Most Dutch epidemiological studies show a diag-
nosed mental disorder in about 20 per cent of children under the age of 18.10 
Some studies even report prevalence rates above 30 per cent,11 but this does not 
mean that all these children require mental healthcare. That depends on the sever-
ity of the problems. GGZ Nederland, a Dutch mental healthcare organization, 
estimates that about 5 per cent of Dutch children have psychological or psychiat-
ric problems of such severity that they cannot function properly in daily life.12 
10) See S. Sytema et al., Verkenningen in de Kinder- en Jeugdpsychiatrie, (Utrecht: Trimbos Institute, 2006), 
p. 12, referring to the HBSC study in 2002 (T. ter Bogt, S. van Dorsselaer and W. Vollebergh, Psychische 
gezondheid, risicogedrag en welbevinden van Nederlandse scholieren, (Utrecht: Trimbos Institute, 2003) and 
the study of Verhulst et al. in 1997 (F.C. Verhulst et al., “The prevalence of DSM-III-R diagnoses in a 
national sample of Dutch adolescents”, Archives of General Psychiatry 54 (1997), pp. 329-336).
11) H.G. Bosweger et al., Jeugd-ggz breed beschikbaar. Ambities voor de jaren 2006-2008, (Amersfoort: 
GGZ Nederland, 2007), p. 15, note 2. The note refers to F.C. Verhulst, “Kinder en Jeugdpsychiatrie”, in: 
A. de Jong et al., Handboek Psychiatrische Epidemiologie, (Maarssen: Elsevier/De Tijdstroom, 1999). It is 
noted that prevalence rates vary, mainly because of diﬀerences in deﬁnitions and research methods. 
12) Ibid., p. 15.
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According to the Trimbos Institute, another Dutch mental healthcare organiza-
tion, at least 7 per cent have such serious problems that they require professional 
care.13 Although the number of children actually using mental healthcare services 
is considerably lower at about 2-3 per cent,14, 15 numbers have clearly grown over 
the years. Between 2007 and 2009, the number of clients in the child and youth 
mental health sector increased by 18 per cent.16 As a result, 140,569 children 
under the age of 18 received treatment in 2009 for mental disorders.17 The usual 
reason for referring a child to a psychiatrist is behavioural problems.18
In most cases, ambulatory or outpatient treatment is suﬃcient to help a child 
with psychiatric problems, but sometimes the problems are so severe that the 
child has to be admitted to a psychiatric hospital. In 2009, 96 per cent of clients 
in the child and youth mental health sector received ambulatory treatment.19 This 
means that child admissions to a psychiatric hospital are relatively rare. However, 
the heightened legislative focus and media attention on the use of seclusion and 
restraint in psychiatric facilities, particularly among minors, have made admis-
sion an important topic.
The vast majority of admissions in the child and youth mental health sector are 
considered voluntary. Voluntary admissions occur in much the same way as 
admissions to a general hospital. Although Dutch law requires the referral to be 
made by childcare services, most referrals are in practice made by the family’s 
general practitioner.20 For the admission to be considered voluntary, the child 
and/or its parents (or legal guardian) have to give informed consent. Children 
over the age of 12 have the legal right to refuse treatment in a psychiatric hospital. 
In that case, the child may have to be admitted as an involuntary patient.21 The 
13) Supra note 10.
14) Supra note 12. 
15) Supra note 7, p. 7, note 21.
16) GGZ Nederland, Zorg op waarde geschat. Update. Sectorrapport ggz 2010, (Amersfoort: GGZ 
Nederland, 2010), p. 19. This report also reveals that, between 2005 and 2009, the largest increase 
in mental health clients was in the child and youth mental health sector, where the number of clients 
increased by 60-75 per cent (p. 27).
17) Ibid., p. 22.
18) Ibid., p. 29.
19) Ibid., p. 40. Between 2007 and 2009, ambulatory treatment in the child and youth mental health 
sector increased by 23 per cent. 
20) Ibid., p. 21. 
21) Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects everyone’s right to liberty and 
states that a deprivation of liberty has to be in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law. Whether 
admission to a psychiatric hospital amounts to deprivation of liberty depends on a whole range of criteria 
such as type, duration, eﬀects and manner of implementation of the measure in question. In the case of 
Nielsen v. Denmark (Judgement of 28 November 1988, Series A (1988) No. 144), the Court held that the 
hospitalization of a 12-year-old boy in a psychiatric ward by virtue of a decision by the mother as sole 
holder of parental rights did not amount to deprivation of liberty but was a responsible exercise by the 
mother of her custodial rights as protected by Article 8 of the Convention. Under Dutch law, a 12-year-
old child could not have been admitted involuntarily solely by virtue of a decision of (one of ) its parents. 
A court order would have been necessary. 
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rules for formal admissions are set out in the Psychiatric Hospitals Act. In order 
for an individual to be admitted by court order, each of the following must apply: 
the individual has a mental disorder (being mental illness, an intellectual disabil-
ity or dementia); the individual represents a danger to himself, others or society; 
the danger is caused by the mental disorder; the individual is over the age of 12 
and unwilling to be admitted voluntarily; and there is no less restrictive form of 
care or treatment available to meet his needs.22 If an individual appears to be suf-
fering from a mental disorder and is in clear and imminent danger of harming 
himself or others, the mayor can also order emergency admission.23 The require-
ments for formal admissions are hardly ever met in the case of children. In 2007, 
there were 330 formal admissions to child and youth mental health facilities, 
while the number in 2008 totalled 276.24 Comparing these numbers to the total 
number of admissions — roughly four to ﬁve thousand children a year receive 
some sort of psychiatric hospital care25 — and assuming most children will not 
readily agree to be taken out of their homes and placed in a psychiatric hospital, 
this can only mean one thing. Care providers devote a lot of time and energy to 
seeking to persuade children and their parents to consent to admission.26 If they 
fail, however, treatment cannot take place and the child will then remain at risk. 
This raises the question of whether the legal framework for treating children with 
psychiatric problems is suited to protecting their best interests.
The second group needing extra attention and protection is people with intel-
lectual disabilities. Recent ﬁgures show there to be around 115,000 people in the 
Netherlands with an intellectual disability.27, 28 The number of people with a seri-
ous intellectual disability (IQ <50), is around 60,000, while the number with a 
mild intellectual disability (IQ of between 50 and 70) is around 55,000. Although 
the current ﬁgures have remained reasonably stable, the target group is becoming 
increasingly older because of the general rise in life expectancy rates and the fact 
that this includes people with a serious or mild intellectual disability.29 In addi-
tion, the need for care within the target group is increasing by around 9 per cent 
22) See Article 2 of the Dutch Psychiatric Hospitals Act. 
23) See Article 20 of the Dutch Psychiatric Hospitals Act. 
24) Supra note 7, pp. 12 and 425.
25) Supra note 16; the estimated number of children who receive psychiatric hospital care is deduced from 
pp. 32 and 40. 
26) Indeed, the ﬁrst and second evaluation of the Dutch Psychiatric Hospitals Act showed that care 
providers in the child and youth mental health sector go to great lengths to get informed consent 
(C. de Groot and M. Donker, Evaluatie Wet Bopz. Deelonderzoek 10-6: De Wet Bopz in de kinder- en 
jeugdpsychiatrie, (The Hague: ZonMw, 2002), pp. 7 and 38).
27) M. Ras, I. Woittiez, H. van Kempen and K. Sadiraj, Steeds meer verstandelijk gehandicapten? 
Ontwikkelingen in vraag en gebruik van zorg voor verstandelijk gehandicapten, (The Hague: Social and 
Cultural Planning Oﬃce, (4) 2010).
28) Estimates vary from 112,000 to 120,000.
29) M. Maaskant and J. Hoekman, Veroudering bij mensen met verstandelijke beperkingen. Vademecum Zorg 
voor Verstandelijk Gehandicapten, (2007).
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a year, in part because of the improved recognition of slight intellectual disabili-
ties and society’s growing demands. Young people (up to the age of 22) account 
for almost half the total growth in demand for care for people with intellectual 
disabilities because of the increasing behavioural, addiction and adhesion prob-
lems experienced in this age group.
People with intellectual disabilities are a vulnerable group. Many clients, most 
of them for a long time and some for the rest of their lives, are dependent on a 
range of care providers. Around half the clients with an intellectual disability 
require some form of support in daily life, varying from 24-hour care to a few 
hours of help at home. Various studies have found that many of these clients 
experience some restrictions to their freedom on a daily basis.30 Considerable 
eﬀorts have been made over the past few years to achieve a change of culture in 
the sector, and care providers are now increasingly aware of the negative conse-
quences of using restraints.31 Many staﬀ are looking for alternatives to invasive 
measures such as tethering bands and seclusion. However, there are no recent 
ﬁgures showing the extent to which measures restraining the freedom of people 
with an intellectual disability are used or whether their use is being reduced.
In the Netherlands, the Psychiatric Hospitals Act provides the legal framework 
under which the freedom of this target group may be restricted. It allows care 
providers to apply freedom restrictions, but only if certain conditions are met. 
The central feature of this Act is the right to self-determination, and this means 
that care providers are only allowed to intervene in a client’s life in certain circum-
stances. By 2002 it was clear that this Act did not provide the correct legal protec-
tion for people with an intellectual disability.32 Many clients who face restrictions 
on their freedom do not fall within the scope of the Act, but are nevertheless 
exposed to such restrictions. Meanwhile clients who are covered by the Act do not 
always enjoy all the ‘beneﬁts’ that it provides. The Psychiatric Hospitals Act is 
complex and focuses too much on psychiatry, with little opportunity to involve 
courts or the Healthcare Inspectorate. Very few clients use the right of complaint 
available to them under the Act, while the role assigned to conﬁdential counsel-
lors is not well suited to dealing with people with intellectual disabilities, and 
many forms of freedom restriction are not recognized as such and are thus applied 
outside the provisions of the Act or do not meet the statutory requirements. 
Opposition by a client is certainly not always taken seriously. A more important 
issue, however, is whether the characteristics of the Act allow care providers to 
30) B.J.M. Frederiks, De rechtspositie van mensen met een verstandelijke handicap. Van beperking naar 
ontplooiing (diss.), (The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers BV, 2004).
31) Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg, Cultuuromslag terugdringen vrijheidsbeperking bij kwetsbare groepen 
in langdurige zorg volop gaande. Duidelijke ambities voor 2011 nodig, (The Hague: 2010). 
32) L.A.P. Arends, K. Blankman and B.J.M. Frederiks, Evaluatie Wet Bopz, Deelonderzoek 10-3: Interne 
rechtspositie in de psychogeriatrie en de verstandelijk gehandicaptensector, (The Hague: ZonMw, 2002).
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support clients in a way that enables them to develop their abilities, even if this 
means that restraint is necessary.
The issue of restraints in the care for people with an intellectual disability was 
widely discussed in the Dutch media in January 2011. This followed a televi-
sion documentary that featured Brandon, an 18-year-old boy with behavioural 
problems, who was mechanically restrained on a daily basis and had been held 
in a room without windows for 24 hours a day over a period of three years. 
This case is not unique, as a recent Health Care Inspectorate report documented 
28 clients who had experienced long-term separation and/or ﬁxation. The Inspec-
torate found the quality and safety of the care provided to people with intellec-
tual disabilities to be inadequate. This shows that we still have a long way to go 
in the Netherlands in terms of the legal position of people with an intellectual 
 disability.33
3. Common Principles
3.1. Self-determination (and Protection)
The right to self-determination is seen as one of the basic principles of health law.34 
It primarily means that an individual has the right to decide for himself what to 
do with his life, without interference by others.35 The right to self-determination 
is not as such deﬁned in law, but some elements can be derived from various 
constitutional rights. Article 10 of the Dutch Constitution, for example, imposes 
a duty on the government to protect everyone’s right to personal integrity. 
Article 11, concerning the inviolability of the human body, is a subspecies of the 
general right to personal integrity and protects against violations such as forced 
medical experiments, corporal punishment, torture and mutilation. Article 15 
also protects the right to liberty. Similar provisions to protect these rights, and 
thus the right to self-determination, are found in European Conventions and 
other international treaties relating to human rights.
Although every individual has the right to self-determination, some people 
may not be able to exercise this right. Children, for example, are not able to exer-
cise any rights at birth. Parents therefore bear the primary responsibility for their 
children and for exercising rights in the children’s best interests. As children get 
older, their abilities to speak, think and reason will develop and they will become 
increasingly capable of making decisions for themselves. This is no diﬀerent in the 
33) B.J.M. Frederiks, “Juridische houdbaarheid van vrijheidsbeperking rammelt. Brandon is meer dan een 
gevaar”, Medisch Contact 66 (2011), pp. 548-550; Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg, Kwaliteit van zorg 
bij langdurige vrijheidsbeperking van mensen met een verstandelijke beperking: vooral de dialoog ontbreekt, 
(The Hague: 2011).
34) Supra note 2, p. 37. 
35) Supra note 6, p. 5.
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case of children with psychiatric problems, except for the fact that normal devel-
opment is aﬀected by mental disorders. In Dutch law, all children under the age 
of 12 are considered incapable of giving informed consent to medical treatment.36 
Children over the age of 12 are, in principle, considered capable of giving con-
sent. The same can generally be said for people with intellectual disabilities. 
Although severe intellectual disabilities often make individuals incapable of mak-
ing decisions for themselves, the mere fact that someone is intellectually disabled 
does not automatically make him incapable. A physician or care provider should 
determine whether a client is capable of giving informed consent for a speciﬁc 
decision and, in any case, should take account of the client’s wishes and prefer-
ences. This also applies to legal representatives who have to make decisions for 
clients if the latter are considered incapable of doing so for themselves in a speciﬁc 
situation.
Individuals’ right to self-determination can be restricted in order to protect the 
rights of others, to protect them from harm or to protect society as a whole.37 In 
this way we recognize the right to protection, which includes accepting responsi-
bility for people unable to defend their own interests (such as children and people 
with intellectual disabilities) and who need care and support.38 Restricting indi-
viduals’ right to self-determination in order to protect them from themselves has 
been widely criticized. However in people who are vulnerable, such as children, 
people with intellectual disabilities and psychiatric patients, this speciﬁc ground 
for restriction may be considered justiﬁed.39 Indeed, the Psychiatric Hospitals Act 
allows for clients to be admitted if this is in their best interests. Formal admission 
is only, however, possible if the mental disorder is so severe that it aﬀects a person’s 
thinking, perceptions, emotions or judgment, and seriously impairs the person’s 
mental function to such an extent that he requires care.40
As stated above, the right to self-determination is primarily seen as a right to 
make decisions without interference by others; in other words, a right to be left 
alone. In vulnerable people, however, this negative interpretation of self-determi-
nation can easily lead to problems. Leaving these people alone may deprive them 
of the care they need. That is why clients considered incapable of making deci-
sions for themselves should ideally have a legal representative. Even then, how-
ever, the legal grounds for treating clients against their will are very strict. The 
Psychiatric Hospitals Act speciﬁcally emphasizes the right to self-determination 
by setting strict rules for involuntary admissions and treatment. In the event of an 
36) See Article 465, Book 7, of the Dutch Civil Code.
37) Supra note 2, p. 40. 
38) Ibid.
39) H. van de Klippe, Dwangtoepassing na onvrijwillige psychiatrische opname. Een juridische beschouwing, 
(Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri, 1997), p. 205.
40) W. Dijkers, “Artikel 2”, in: W.J.A.M. Dijkers and T.P.J.C. Widdershoven (eds.), De wet BOPZ: 
artikelgewijs commentaar, (The Hague: Koninklijke Vermande (loose-leaf, with supplements)) note 2.4, 
pp. 38-39.
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involuntary admission, psychiatric patients/clients can only be treated against 
their will if their mental disorder means they represent a danger to themselves or 
others or, if not treated, they would have to stay in the hospital for an unreason-
able length of time.41 In emergency situations not foreseen in the treatment plan, 
clients admitted involuntarily can also be restrained or secluded for up to seven 
days.42 Here too, however, the mental disorder has to be such that there is a dan-
ger to the client or others. As these conditions are hardly ever met in the case of 
children with psychiatric problems and people with intellectual disabilities, and 
they therefore risk being deprived of the care they need, the prevailing view on 
self-determination has come under attack.43, 44, 45
At the same time, however, it is important to avoid unjustiﬁed paternalism; in 
other words, failing to take the wishes of the client seriously enough. There is a 
danger of people with intellectual disabilities too quickly being regarded as lack-
ing the capacity to express their will. There are therefore various additional 
requirements for the duty of care that have to be met in respect of this group, and 
also in cases involving children.46 Measures that restrict freedom, child-protection 
measures and requests to appoint a guardian or mentor are only regarded as legit-
imate if the client in question is unable to understand the consequences of his 
actions, if these actions are damaging to the client and if the measure complies 
with the subsidiarity, proportionality and eﬀectiveness criteria, is carefully exe-
cuted (including, for example, a note in the care plan, an assessment and the 
involvement of various disciplines) and contributes to the personal development 
of the client.47 Looking again at the recent case of Brandon, we can see that the 
measure imposed — being tethered to the wall — did not meet these criteria. 
Admittedly Brandon was protected against the damage that could be caused by 
his own actions, but no weight appears to have been (or allowed to have been) 
attached to the other criteria. This case shows that the right to protection can also 
be interpreted too narrowly, and that this has certain consequences for the client’s 
right to self-determination.
3.2. Good Care
The previous section considers the questions of self-determination and protec-
tion. Both elements are crucial for the personal development of clients with an 
41) See Article 38(5) and 38c of the Psychiatric Hospitals Act.
42) See Article 39 of the Psychiatric Hospitals Act.
43) G.A.M. Widdershoven, R.L.P. Berghmans and A.C. Molewijk, “Autonomie in de psychiatrie”, 
Tijdschrift voor de Psychiatrie 42 (2000), pp. 389-390. 
44) Supra note 30, pp. 91-93. 
45) Supra note 7, pp. 99-102.
46) These requirements for the duty of care apply both in respect of protective measures applied and 
limitations on self-determination.
47) Supra note 30, pp. 96-97.
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intellectual disability and for children. The two principles are closely related and 
can essentially be seen as two sides of the same coin. Together they combine to 
constitute good care. Good care implies an active duty of protection, focusing on 
encouraging clients’ opportunities for development, irrespective of whether they 
are an adult or a child, and irrespective of whether they are capable or incapable 
of expressing their will.48 The conditions applying in this respect are discussed in 
the previous section. Health law literature does not always regard good care as a 
separate principle, but often more as a modality of the right to healthcare or as 
part of the principle of protection.49 Our view, however, diﬀers.
The right to healthcare is laid down in Article 22 (1) of the Dutch Constitution 
and is a social human right. Although good care is based on this right, in many 
ways it shows the characteristics of an individual right and so may be compared 
to the right to self-determination. Good care is an accentuation of the right to 
healthcare and consists of three elements: quality, geographical accessibility and 
ﬁnancial accessibility. The emphasis in good care is more on the provision of 
good-quality care, and less on the elements of availability and accessibility. In this 
context the right to good care may be described as ‘care which is centred on the 
individual and which contributes to the development of the client’.50
Care providers need to possess certain qualities to be able to oﬀer such client-
centred care. These qualities are referred to in the Dutch Civil Code as the ‘profes-
sional standards applicable to providers of care’.51 Although the legislator provides 
only a general explanation of this term, the right to good care means the role of a 
care provider must be an active role. The provider must be able to empathize with 
the client and the client’s situation in order to be able to contribute to the client’s 
development. From this perspective, care can be seen as oﬀering support to cli-
ents. In the modern interpretation, care is in many ways similar to support, with 
the emphasis no longer being on what the client is unable to do, but instead on 
empowering the client. Care providers’ responsibilities are also, therefore, deemed 
to include being understanding and committed to helping clients to go forward. 
These are just some of the characteristics of good care.52
In summary, providing good care means ensuring that the actions of a care 
provider are geared towards stimulating the abilities of a patient/client, despite 
any disabilities or psychiatric problems there may be. Instead of focusing on non-
intervention, a focus on support where possible and necessary is preferable. As this 
48) Supra note 3, p. 8.
49) Supra note 2, p. 42.
50) Supra note 30, pp. 101-106.
51) Article 453, Book 7, Dutch Civil Code.
52) G. Widdershoven, R.L.P. Berghmans and S.P.K. Welie, “Zelfbeschikking of goede zorg? Ethische 
kanttekeningen bij juridisering in de hulpverlening”, in: A.H. Schene et al., Jaarboek voor psychiatrie en 
psychotherapie, (Houten/Diegem: Bohn Staﬂeu van Loghum, 2003), pp. 325-338.
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approach, however, may verge in the direction of paternalism, it is essential for 
care providers to be transparent in their actions and accountable to third parties.
3.3. Development
During the 20th century society came to realize that children, and also people 
with intellectual disabilities, are more than simply objects in need of protection. 
They are individuals and, therefore, subjects with their own rights and responsi-
bilities, appropriate to their age and stage of development. This new view on the 
legal position of children was the basis for the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, which sets the focus ﬁrmly on the right to development. Under the Con-
vention, states must respect the rights and responsibilities of parents to provide 
guidance for the child appropriate to his evolving capacities. They are also obliged 
to ensure the child’s development and to provide him with adequate care if his 
parents fail to do so.53 This means that children rely primarily on their parents for 
invoking the right to development, but also on the government.54 In Dutch Law, 
the main area in which the right to development is reﬂected is in family law and 
the regulations governing child and youth care. The ‘best interests of the child’ are 
almost always deﬁned in terms of development.
Although the right to development is most frequently referred to in the context 
of children’s rights and family law, it has also gained focus and attention in discus-
sions on the legal status of people with intellectual disabilities.55 The prevailing 
view is that these people should have equal opportunities and therefore be sup-
ported so that they are able to function as much as possible like any other group 
of people in society.56 In other words, people with intellectual disabilities have a 
right to develop their abilities to the extent possible. Indeed, the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child states that disabled children have the right to special care 
to help them enjoy a full and decent life in dignity and achieve the greatest degree 
of self-reliance and social integration possible.57 The same should apply in respect 
of disabled adults because reaching adulthood is by no means an indication that 
a client no longer needs some kind of support.58 This principle also applies in 
respect of people with very serious intellectual disabilities who are nevertheless 
able to develop to some degree.
53) Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Convention. 
54) See M. de Langen, Recht voor jeugdigen. Een onderzoek naar rechten en rechtsbeginselen in het jeugdrecht, 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom Uitgeverij, 1973), p. 24. 
55) The right to development is explicitly mentioned in the Bill on the Principles of Long-Term Care 
[Beginselenwet zorginstellingen], which is intended for clients in the long-term care, including those with 
an intellectual disability.
56) B.J.M. Frederiks, R.H. Van Hooren and X. Moonen, “Nieuwe kansen voor het burgerschapspara-
digma: een pedagogisch, ethisch en juridische beschouwing”, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Zorg aan 
Mensen met Verstandelijke Beperkingen (2009), pp. 3-30.
57) Article 23 of the Convention.
58) Supra note 8, p. 156. 
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There is a close relationship between the right to development and other prin-
ciples of law. In general, the ultimate goal of human development is to maximize 
people’s self-determination and personal responsibility. In a sense, therefore, self-
determination is conditional to development. The fact that the development of 
vulnerable people is often impaired by a disorder serves to emphasize the need for 
support. It is only through support that these people can achieve a higher level of 
self-determination, as also stated in the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities. In the case, however, of children with psychiatric 
problems, simply providing support is not enough. They also need guidance and, 
of course, psychiatric treatment. This demands special care.59 Dutch mental health 
law, however, focuses on treatment and on removing the danger that a client rep-
resents to himself or others. And this is not enough for the vulnerable people to 
whom we are referring.
4. Self-determination Revisited
When treating children with psychiatric problems, as well as caring for people 
with intellectual disabilities, there is an innate tension between respecting clients’ 
right to self-determination and protecting them from harm. Care providers need 
to ﬁnd a balance between these two principles, keeping in mind that clients also 
have a right to good care and a right to development. This demands a diﬀerent 
perspective. By focusing (too much) on self-determination or protection, care 
providers do not provide children or people who have an intellectual disability 
with the care they need. A primary objective in providing care and support in 
both groups is to oﬀer clients a perspective for the future. Although the right to 
self-determination may need to be restricted, that does not have to mean allowing 
clients or children to cease developing. A number of critical remarks can be made 
in this context with regard to the case of Brandon. Although the State Secretary 
and the Healthcare Inspectorate concluded that the legal criteria of the Psychiat-
ric Hospitals Act had been met, Brandon deserved much better. The mechanical 
restraint had started three years earlier to remove the danger that Brandon repre-
sented to himself and/or others. In January 2011, however, it was unclear as to 
whether the danger still existed. What about Brandon’s perspective? The Psychi-
atric Hospitals Act also contains three additional legal criteria for care providers 
to determine whether restraints are necessary in a speciﬁc individual case. Is the 
restraint in proportion to the intended goal? Can the restraint be replaced by a 
reasonable, less intrusive alternative? Is the restraint eﬀective (i.e. does it contrib-
ute to achieving the intended goal?). According to the criteria, restraints of free-
dom must serve some purpose. The aim cannot solely be to remove the danger by 
59) Supra note 7, pp. 126 and 130. 
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providing safety for the client and society. However dangerous clients may be, if 
the care provided to them is to be good, it must include their right to support and 
a future. In our view, this case conﬁrms the fact that care providers, but also the 
State Secretary and the Healthcare Inspectorate, apply a very narrow interpreta-
tion of the right to self-determination and protection. Respecting the rights of 
vulnerable clients demands more: as well as the right to self-determination, they 
also have a right to good care and development. An important question, there-
fore, is whether new legislation will create greater scope for these principles.
5. Replacing the Dutch Psychiatric Hospitals Act
5.1. Background
It is fair to say that the Dutch Psychiatric Hospitals Act has been subject to regu-
lar criticism, with one of the main points of this criticism being the broad scope 
of the Act. Not only does it set the rules for involuntary admissions and treatment 
of psychiatric patients, but it also applies to people with intellectual disabilities 
and those with dementia. These people, too, can be admitted by court order. The 
Act also sets out speciﬁc procedures for allowing such people to be admitted by a 
committee [Bopz-indicatiecommissie] if they are unable either to give or withhold 
consent for admission.60 No judges sit on these committees. The rules for treat-
ment are the same for all involuntary patients; in 2008, however, a distinction 
was made, when the grounds for involuntary treatment of psychiatric patients 
were extended.61 Nevertheless, the Act focuses mainly on psychiatry — adult 
psychiatry, to be more precise — and many of the rules are therefore not really 
designed for treating people with intellectual disabilities or dementia. Indeed, it 
is even incorrect to speak in terms of treatment. The ﬁrst and second evaluations 
of the Act conﬁrmed that the legislation was not suitable for people with intel-
lectual disabilities or dementia as the legal status of these individuals was not well 
protected. In 2005, therefore, the Dutch government decided to devise a separate 
set of rules for these people, with a focus on and attention for all-round care 
rather than admissions.62
Meanwhile, however, the legal position of psychiatric patients has also come 
under discussion. Firstly, the Psychiatric Hospitals Act is very complex legisla-
tion, providing for various diﬀerent types of court orders, each with its own set of 
rules. The court order referred to in section 2 of this article is the one most com-
monly issued. Another concern is the fact that the Act emphasizes the right to 
60) See Article 60 of the Psychiatric Hospitals Act. 
61) Act of 25 February 2008, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2008, 80; Articles 38a-38c.
62) See Parliamentary Papers II 2004/05, 28 950, No. 5.
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self-determination and focuses on (intramural) admissions rather than on treat-
ment. Courts are only involved in the admissions procedure. Over the years, 
however, the ﬁeld of psychiatry has focused more and more on treating patients 
outside hospital walls. This led to a change in the law in 2004, when provisions 
for conditional ambulatory treatment were introduced into the Psychiatric Hos-
pitals Act.63 Even so, the Act is no longer considered ‘future-proof ’, as the third 
evaluating committee pointed out.64 In 2008, the Dutch government therefore 
decided to replace it by new legislation.65
Finally, in 2009 and 2010, two legal frameworks designed to replace the Psy-
chiatric Hospitals Act were presented to Parliament for debate. The Care and 
Coercion Bill [Wetsvoorstel zorg en dwang]66 speciﬁcally caters for people with 
intellectual disabilities or dementia, while the Compulsory Mental Healthcare 
Bill [Wetsvoorstel verplichte GGZ]67 is restricted to psychiatric patients. Both Bills 
claim to focus on good care, but by setting out very diﬀerent sets of rules.
5.2. Care and Coercion Bill
The primary aim of the Care and Coercion Bill is to strengthen the legal position 
of clients with an intellectual disability or dementia.68 The Bill sets out the proce-
dures to be followed by care providers in the form of a multi-stage plan. Each 
stage of this plan has to be checked before providers are permitted to impose 
coercion. The care plan plays an important role, including in the care provided to 
involuntary patients. The Bill should also, however, take greater account of the 
special nature of these target groups, where care is long-term and where coercion 
is not unusual and can also be very invasive.
A special aspect of this Bill is that it has been designed for people of whom the 
majority are incapable of expressing their will. In our view, this starting point 
does not do justice to this target group as many clients with a (slight) intellectual 
disability can make their wishes known, admittedly in their own way. The Bill 
should take more account of this if it is to result in good care.
The Bill focuses on the issue of good care to a greater extent than the Psychiat-
ric Hospitals Act does in that the emphasis is no longer on admissions. The Bill 
explicitly seeks to distance itself from the one-sided approach in the Psychiatric 
Hospitals Act (in other words, respect for the right of self-determination). The 
63) Act of 13 July 2002, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2002, 431, as amended by Act of 25 February 2008, 
Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2008, 80, Articles 14a-14g.
64) R.B.M. Keurentjes, Rapport van de derde Evaluatiecommissie van de Wet Bijzondere opnemingen in 
psychiatrische ziekenhuizen. 1. Evaluatierapport: voortschrijdende inzichten, (The Hague: Ministry of 
Health, Welfare and Sport, 2007), p. 106. 
65) Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 25 763, No. 9; Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 30 492, Nos. E 
and F.
66) Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 31 996, No. 2.
67) Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 32 399, No. 2.
68) Parliamentary Papers II 2010/2011, 31 996, No. 6.
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criteria for restraint are more broadly formulated, with danger as the norm being 
replaced by serious disadvantage.
The absence of good and clear legal protection, however, is a major failing. The 
Bill gives care providers more scope to structure ‘responsible care’ in the way they 
consider best.69 The legislator does not stipulate who may restrict freedom and 
how this is permitted. In contrast to the Compulsory Mental Healthcare Bill, this 
Bill does not make provision for a conﬁdential counsellor or for a court review or 
a decision by a committee in the event of involuntary care. Nor does it provide 
for close involvement of the Healthcare Inspectorate and/or a review committee. 
Moreover, all forms of restricting freedom are dealt with in the same way, regard-
less of whether they involve prohibiting a second cup of coﬀee or being kept in 
seclusion for three months.
In view of the right to development, the legislator could have been expected to 
consider long-term forms of freedom restriction particularly carefully. What is the 
added value of the new Bill for the client? Why has the legislator failed to make a 
distinction between restriction and restraint?
5.3. Compulsory Mental Healthcare Bill
This Bill aims to strengthen the legal position of people with a mental illness who 
receive involuntary mental healthcare.70 According to the Dutch government, 
strengthening these people’s legal position will enhance the quality of care. To 
reach this goal, the Bill sets out a very elaborate procedure for authorizing ‘com-
pulsory care’. Compulsory care can be authorized if a person has a mental illness 
that puts him at a ‘substantial risk of serious harm’ to himself or others. As 
explained in the notes to the Bill, this criterion should be interpreted in much the 
same way as ‘danger’ in the Psychiatric Hospitals Act. There seems, therefore, to 
be no intention to expand the grounds for involuntary mental healthcare.71 Con-
trary to the Psychiatric Hospitals Act, a court order is only needed if a patient 
(over the age of 12) or the patient’s legal representative actively resists mental 
healthcare. Compulsory care, however, is not restricted to involuntary admis-
sions. A patient can also be required by court order to undergo treatment without 
being admitted to a psychiatric hospital. In fact, the Bill allows various forms of 
compulsory care to be authorized by a court, including pedagogical and safety 
measures. The Bill also introduced the concept of an independent committee of 
experts to advise the court on the form of care considered most eﬀective for 
reducing the speciﬁc risk.
69) B.J.M. Frederiks, “Compulsory care and coercion: a new Dutch Legal Framework for restraints in the 
care for people with an intellectual disability”, Challenging behaviour & Mental Health, SIRG newsletter 
(2010).
70) Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 32 399, No. 3, pp. 1-2.
71) Ibid., p. 42.
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The Bill has a strong focus on avoiding involuntary mental healthcare. More so 
than the Dutch Psychiatric Hospitals Act, it focuses on the patient and on reach-
ing agreement on the best possible care. Even in cases involving compulsory care, 
the patient’s wishes and preferences are to be respected as much as possible. Here 
we can recognize the right to good care. The Bill also considers the right to devel-
opment in that Article 3:3 includes the criteria of subsidiarity, proportionality 
and eﬃcacy. Any compulsory care provided must meet these criteria. In other 
words, any restriction on freedom must serve a clear purpose. Another good point 
in the Bill is that Article 3:4 allows compulsory care also to be provided in order 
to stabilize a person’s mental health or to allow a person’s mental health to be 
restored to such an extent that he regains as much autonomy as possible. Here, 
too, we can recognize aspects of good care. The legislator goes further in this 
respect in this Bill than in the Psychiatric Hospitals Act, which is limited to pre-
venting danger.
Although the above principles are to be applauded, ﬁeld organizations and 
experts have justly criticized many of the rules contained in the Bill.72 For one, 
it was thought unnecessarily time-consuming and expensive for a patient to be 
heard and assessed both by an advisory committee and a court.73 The govern-
ment is consequently looking into other (cheaper) alternatives for the advisory 
 committee.74 The Bill also vests considerable power in ‘care managers’ to decide 
whether to impose compulsory care, without specifying the level of expertise 
required of these managers.
Apart from some — rather confusing — rules about representation, not 
much thought appears to have been given in the Bill to the legal position of 
children with psychiatric problems.75 One of the main bottlenecks in child and 
youth psychiatry is that it is hard to establish whether a child is mentally ill 
and whether this means he represents a danger justifying compulsory admission 
and treatment.76, 77, 78 Although the Bill clariﬁes that compulsory care is also 
72) See, for example, the letter of 6 February 2009 of KNMG, NVvP and NVVA (annex to Parliamentary 
Papers II 2009/10, 32 399, No. 3); also T.P. Widdershoven, “Opvolger Wet Bopz: goed op weg, maar 
we zijn er nog niet. Opmerkingen bij het conceptontwerp Wet verplichte geestelijke gezondheidszorg”, 
Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht 33 (2009), pp. 175-184.
73) J. Legemaate, “Besluiten over dwang in de psychiatrie: ken je klassieken!”, Nederlands Juristenblad 
(2008), pp. 1852-1856; T.P. Widdershoven, “Dwangpsychiatrie: rechters, deskundigen, kwaliteit en 
geld”, Nederlands Juristenblad (2008), pp. 1863-1864; J.R. van Veldhuizen, “Adviseren of beslissen? 
De positie van de Commissie Psychiatrische Zorg in de Wet Verplichte Geestelijke Gezondheidszorg”, 
Journaal Ggz en recht (2009), pp. 155-171; and several articles in Journaal Ggz en recht 7(2) (2011). 
74) See J.R. van Veldhuizen, “Wat wordt er van de Wet verplichte ggz zonder een commissie?”, Journaal 
Ggz en recht 7(3-4) (2011), pp. 63-68.
75) V.E.T. Dörenberg, “Het Wetsvoorstel verplichte geestelijke gezondheidszorg”, Tijdschrift voor 
Gezondheidsrecht 35 (2011), pp. 291-292. 
76) Supra note 7, pp. 185-188.
77) Supra note 40, note 2.4.3, p. 43.
78) B.M. Trooster, “De Wet Bijzondere Opnemingen Psychiatrische Ziekenhuizen (BOPZ)”, in: N. Duits, 
J.A.C. Bartels and W.B. Gunning (eds.), Jeugdpsychiatrie en Recht, (Assen: Koninklijke Van Gorcum, 
2004), pp. 323-324.
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possible if a person’s development is threatened, a link to an established mental 
disorder is still needed. The fact that parents are often also very ambivalent about 
agreeing to mental healthcare for their children continues to put pressure on 
relationships between care providers, children and parents, thus posing a risk in 
early  treatment.
6. Conclusion
In the introduction we queried whether the right to self-determination was still 
the best principle in health law, particularly in caring for people with intellectual 
disabilities and children with psychiatric problems. We can be very brief in 
answering this question. The current legal framework focuses too much on the 
right to self-determination, with the legislator seeming to overlook the fact that 
the vulnerable position of these groups means they need more in order to be able 
to function in society. Both the recent case of Brandon and the current situation 
concerning children with psychiatric problems support this conclusion.
The right to development completes the normative framework for the legal 
position of people with intellectual disabilities and children with psychiatric 
problems. In the new Bills — the Care and Coercion Bill, and the Compulsory 
Mental Healthcare Bill — the legislator seems to have adopted a broader focus, 
with the right to good care and the right to development also being assigned a 
place. In this way the legislator seems to have moved away from the one-sided 
interpretation of self-determination. The ultimate aim in the care provided to 
people with intellectual disabilities and children with psychiatric problems is not 
their wish to be left alone, out of respect for their right to self-determination. 
They also want the right form of care and support in order to attain a meaningful 
place for themselves in society.
An issue brieﬂy examined here is the question of why the legislator is seeking to 
provide diﬀerent levels of protection for the two groups. Both groups are currently 
covered by the same legislation. In the new situation, however, the legal protec-
tion aﬀorded to children with intellectual disabilities will be diﬀerent from that 
available to children with psychiatric problems. Although the Care and Coercion 
Bill seeks to improve the legal position of people, including children, with intel-
lectual disabilities, the Bill as it stands contains many legal shortcomings. Care 
providers, for example, are to be given responsibility for shaping  certain aspects 
of the care as they see ﬁt (under the heading of ‘responsible care’). It would be 
advisable, however, for the legislator either to set the same rules and criteria for 
both groups or, if there are to be two diﬀerent sets of regulations, at least to ensure 
greater coherence and equivalence. Although the Bills are certainly an improve-
ment, in certain respects they also seem to represent a step  backwards.
And this step backwards also has implications for elderly people. Firstly the 
Care and Coercion Bill is also intended to apply to people with dementia, 
who will now suﬀer the same (legal) shortcomings. Of much more importance, 
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however, is the fact that children with psychiatric problems grow old, while the 
life expectancy rates of people with an intellectual disability are increasing. If their 
legal position is not arranged properly at the start of their lives, this may have 
consequences for the care that they will be so much in need of in a later phase of 
life. And the question is whether this is really what society wants at a time when 
it already has to cope with an increasingly ageing population and ongoing cost 
cutting in the healthcare sector.
